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STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND ENDOGENOUS
WORKER RECALL PROBABILITIES
Abstract
In this paper we investigate the incentives of unemployed workers to wait for
a recall when recall probabilities are endogenously determined by the waiting
decisions of others. Because of a positive externality that arises when
workers seek new employment, an excessive number of workers choose to
wait for a recall, and structural adjustment is slow. We also find that a small
reduction in the unemployment benefits, or introducing a small cash bonus
for workers that get a new job, may have no e.ect on unemployment in some
cases, while eradicating significant levels of unemployment in other cases.
Our analysis suggests that the government may face a Samaritan’s Dilemma
if it can influence the recall probability of workers, and that multiple equilibria
may exist in a game involving both workers and an unemployment-averse
government. Furthermore, we explore a link to the war of attrition literature,
showing that the Bulow and Klemperer (1999) ”one too many”-result may not
hold if there is uncertainty concerning when the game ends.
JEL Classification: D83, J64, R23.













Consider an economy in which a sector, or a region, experiences a slump in
de ma nd. Many wo rke rs l o s e t he i r j ob. Ea ch une mpl oyed wo rke r c an cho o s e
either to stay and wait for better times, or undertake a costly move and
search for a job in another sector. What will she do, stay or move?
As usual, the answer depends on many factors - such as the magnitude
of the moving costs, the replacement ratio of the unemployment beneﬁts, on
the availability of jobs elsewhere and on the prospect of getting rehired in
the old sector. The last factor, the prospect of getting recalled to a job - an
alternative that does not require costly search - is usually not considered in
search models. As Katz (1986) notes, the standard job search model focuses
on the search behavior of new entrants to the labor force, or workers’ per-
manently displaced from their previous employers. By not paying attention
to recall possibilities, the models overlook a highly relevant factor.
Meyer and Katz (1990) show that in their sample 70% of the unemployed
workers that received unemployment beneﬁts, expected to be recalled to
previous work. They also ﬁnd that the prospect of a recall inﬂuences job
search behavior, reemployment earnings and the duration of unemployment
spells. Katz (1986) extends the standard job search model by including an
exogenous recall probability. He shows that an improvement in the recall
prospects reduces the probability of getting a new job both by increasing the
reservation wage, and by lowering the intensity of search. Pissarides (1982)
is another job search model that takes the prospect of recalls into account.
Both take the recall probability to be exogenous. In Katz (1986) there is
a ﬁxed probability p that an unemployed worker, still waiting for his old job
in period t, will be recalled in that period. An example could be an industry
that faces two states of demand, high or low. The high demand state requires
H workers, the low demand state L<Hworkers. Demand is currently low
and (H − L) workers are unemployed. The low demand state is either due
t oat r a n s i t o r ys h o c k ,o rt oap e r m a n e n td e c l i n ei nd e m a n d . I ft h es h o c k
is transitory the probability of a shift to high demand is generated from a
Poisson process with a parameter p. This process generates an exogenous
recall probability. Speciﬁcally, one unemployed workers’s prospect of getting
a recall does not depend on the decisions made by other unemployed workers.
Add a small, quite natural, twist to the example and this is no longer
the case. Consider an industry, a sector or a region, that faces three demand
states, high, medium or low. The number of workers required in each state
are H, M and L, respectively, where H>M>L . Demand has dropped
from the high state to the low state, and there are (H − L) unemployed
workers. As above the low demand state is either due to a transitory shock,
2or to a permanent decline in demand. Everyone consent on this, but they
also realize that even if we are in a transitory bad state, the market will
never restore to old heights. The best one can hope for is a partial revival
of demand. Speciﬁcally, if the shock is transitory there is a probability that
demand will return to the medium level. That is, if demand revives (M −L)
workers will be rehired. Initially, there are (H − L) unemployed individuals
waiting for, at best, (M − L) recalls. The probability of being recalled is no
longer exogenous, but depends on the decisions made by other unemployed
workers. One person’s probability of being rehired in the injured sector,
increases when another person decides to leave and search for a job elsewhere.
A worker calculating private costs and beneﬁts of the two alternatives, stay
or move, will not take into account how his decision aﬀects the prospects of
other unemployed workers.
The aim of this paper is to understand how this externality slows down
the transition process in an economy that encounters geographic or sectorial
changes in economic activity. Particularly, we want to understand how diﬀer-
ent policy instruments, such as the replacement ratio of unemployment ben-
eﬁts, cash bonuses to workers that ﬁnd a new job and government programs
initiated to stimulate demand in the injured sector, aﬀect the adjustment
process.
In our model, situations arise where the number of workers that wait for
a recall is higher than the number of possible job openings - which is consis-
tent with the results of Meyer and Katz (1990). The fact that an excessive
number of workers may be unemployed do not come as a surprise to search
theorists; such patterns would be anticipated on the grounds of adverse in-
centives for job search created by, for instance, unemployment beneﬁts.1 As
noted by Meyer (1995), relating to unemployment insurance payments: ”A
prime cause of overpayments ... is the failure of claimants actively to seek
work.” In this paper, we explore another avenue that might lead to excessive
unemployment, namely the positive externality associated with moving away
from the injured sector. Hence, our model provides an additional argument
for using policy measures to reduce unemployment.2 Obvious policy can-
didates are a reduction in the unemployment beneﬁts (possibly politically
unfeasible), or a moving cost subsidy. We show that both these reforms may
have everything from no eﬀect on unemployment, to instantly eradicating it.
Although our set-up is highly stylized, the result non the less suggests that
non-continuous responses to changes in policy variables may be expected.
1See for instance Burtless (1990) or Layard et al. (1994).
2Meyer (1995) provides an overview of U.S. experiments aimed at evaluating the eﬀects
of such reforms - most notably cash bonuses for quick reemployment, and job search
programs.
3Another policy that might potentially reduce unemployment is job cre-
ation programs.3 This policy, however, turns out to be a double edged sword.
Our analysis suggests, that job creation programs can slow down the struc-
tural adjustment process. This will be the case if the perceived recall prob-
ability is - at least in part - caused by the governments inability to commit
not to initiate job a creation program. In such situations, we argue that the
authorities may face a type Samaritan’s Dilemma, as the expectations of job
creation programs cause high levels of unemployment, which in turn may
trigger the initiation of such programs. Also, we discuss the possibility that
this ‘game’ between the authorities and the unemployed exhibits multiple
equilibria.
In order to harness the eﬀects of having an endogenous recall probability,
as discussed above, we do not model search explicitly. Rather we assume that
the unemployed can get a job in another sector with certainty if they pay a
ﬁxed moving cost, and hence we focus on the waiting decisions of workers.
Thus, strictly speaking, we model a waiting game - a type of game that has
been extensively studied within the literature on contests.
In contests two or more individuals exert costly eﬀort to enhance their
probability of winning a prize. The prize can be a seat in the parliament,
a monopoly position, a high rank job in a ﬁrm, a patent etc.4 The waiting
game is one subgroup within contests, most often referred to as the ”war of
attrition”. In the classic version of the game, there are two players, each
trying to wait the other out to win a prize. The game stops when one of the
players concede, and the prize goes to the other player. In our example, the
‘prize’ would be getting a job without paying any moving costs. However,
there are many workers (H − L), competing for multiple ‘prizes’ (M − L
possible recalls). Two recent papers, Clark and Riis (1996) and Bulow and
Klemperer (1999), extend the war of attrition game to situations where there
is competition over more than one prize. We discuss their results and identify
idiosyncrasies that prevent us from directly applying their ﬁndings. Our
analysis then suggests an extension of the multiple prize war of attrition
game.
The following section of our paper presents the formal model, with sec-
tions 3 and 4 discussing, respectively, the special cases of a constant and
a declining probability of market revival. In section 5 we derive some pol-
icy implications, while section 6 addresses the links to the war of attrition
3This could be obtained through, for instance, increased subsidies to the aﬄicted in-
dustry, increased spending in the public sector etc.
4For an introduction to the theory of contests, see for instance Hirshleifer and Riley
(1992). For more specialized applications, Lockard and Tullock (2001) (rent-seeking) and
Lazear (1995) (labor market tournaments) can be recommended.
4literature. Section 7 concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
We have already described the basic setting. One sector, denoted A,h a s
experienced a slump in demand. Each unemployed worker can search for
work elsewhere (sector B), or stay in sector A and wait for better times.
If an unemployed worker moves she gets a job with certainty in another
sector, but has to pay a moving cost c. Of course, it would be more realistic
to assume she has to search for a job elsewhere, and to let the outcome of
this search process be uncertain. But, since it is the moving decision -n o t
the search process - that concern us here, we simply assume that by paying
ac o s tc, she gets a job in the other sector with certainty.
There are three diﬀerent demand states facing the producers in this sector:
a high demand state in which H workers are needed, a low demand state in
which L workers are needed, and in between, a medium level in which M
workers are required in the sector. When we enter the economy, at time 0,
there has been a slump in demand and there are H −L unemployed workers.
The low demand state is either permanent or transitory. In the latter case
t h e r ei sap r o b a b i l i t yp(t) that demand restores to a medium level in period
t, conditional on demand being low in period t − 1, where t measures the
number of periods that has passed since there was a drop in demand. If
demand increases (M − L) workers are rehired.5 If demand returns to the
M state, it will stay that way for ever.
An unemployed worker might leave sector A immediately, at stage 0, or
wait one period. If she waits two outcomes are possible. Demand might
partly recover, she then has a chance of being recalled to work in sector A.
Alternatively, the L s t a t ep r e v a i l sa n ds h ef a c e st h es a m em o v e - w a i td e c i s i o n
in the next period. In general, an unemployed worker might wait t periods
and leave at stage t>0. Let mt be the number of workers that has left sector
A when we enter stage t.
To make life simple we assume there to be an institutionally set wage level
w in the economy.6 Unemployed workers receive unemployment beneﬁts b
5We can relax this assumption and still bring home our basic argument. All we need,
in order to get endogenous recall probabilities, is that there is some probability that the
new permanent demand state is between the old high and the present low. It could for
example be the case that if the low demand shock is transitory, demand either increases
to its former high level or to a medium level.
6With a ﬁx e dw a g el e v e l ,ad r o pi nd e m a n di ns e c t o rA generate unemployment. If
the wage was perfectly ﬂexible, there would be no unemployment, but a drop in demand
would lead to lower wages in sector A. Some of the workers might then prefer to leave
5per period. Each individual is risk neutral, has an inﬁnite time horizon,
a discount factor δ, and seeks employment in another sector if expected
lifetime earnings are higher elsewhere. Let E [U(t)i] denote the expected
lifetime utility as seen from stage t if decision i =( move,wait) is taken. An
unemployed worker moves at stage t if E [U(t)move] >E[U(t)wait].T o g e t
an interesting situation we assume that workers move from sector A if the
probability of a recall is zero, that is, we assume w(1 − δ)
−1−c>b(1 − δ)
−1 .
Hence, everyone who does not get a recall to a job in sector A if demand
increases, leaves sector A immediately.
To characterize the transition process, that is, to characterize the se-
quence {mt}
∞
0 , we need further assumptions about the probability that de-
mand recovers to the medium level.
3 Constant transition probability
Assume ﬁrst that the probability of a transition from state L to state M
is constant over time, i.e. pt = p>0 for all t. The recall probability need
not be constant over time, however, since the probability of being recalled if
demand increases, depends on the number of workers that has left sector A.
Suppose demand is low at t ≥ 0. If a person still waiting for better times in














while the highest possible recall probability is equal to p.
We search for a transition pattern that constitutes a Nash-equilibrium at
each stage. In other words, we require each individual’s decision - stay or
move - to be optimal given the decisions made by the others that are facing
the same stay-move choice. To characterize such equilibrium patterns, we
need to calculate the expected payoﬀs of the two alternatives, stay or move.
The discounted value of moving is independent of when a person moves;






w − c, for all t ≥ 0.
The expected discounted value of waiting is given by
the sector. Assuming that the marginal productivity of labour decreases in the number
of individuals working in sector A, we would still have a postitive externality associated
with any exits from the sector. When one person moves from the sector, this increases the
marginal productivity and the wage for those who choose to remain and wait for better
times.
6E [U(t)wait]=b + δ[qt+1
1
1 − δ
w +( p − qt+1)(
1
1 − δ
w − c)] (2)
+ δ(1 − p)(max{E [U(t +1 ) ] wait,E[U(t +1 ) ] move}).
A worker who, at stage t ≥ 0, decides to stay unemployed another period
and wait for a job in sector A, earns unemployment beneﬁts b in the ﬁrst pe-
riod. At the start of the next period, the M state is realized with probability
p, and thus there is a probability qt+1 that an unemployed worker is recalled
to former work. If she is recalled she earns a wage w in each period forever.
With the complimentary probability, she is not recalled to work in her old sec-






She then knows that there are no chances of getting recalled to work in sector
A in the future, and she moves immediately to seek work in sector B.
With probability (1−p), demand stays at the low level, which means that
the unemployed worker again faces the stay-move decision, and she chooses
the option that maximizes her expected discounted earnings. Note that the
individual value of waiting at time t increases in the number of individuals
that decide to move at stage t as long as less than H − M individuals have
left up until and including time t. T h er e a s o ni so fc o u r s et h a tt h ei n d i v i d u a l
recall probability increases in mt+1 if mt+1 <H− M .
3.1 The equilibria
We enter at stage 0, immediately after there has been a decline in demand.
There are three diﬀerent exit patterns that are consistent with our equilib-
rium notion:
1. No one moves: E [U(0)wait] >E[U(0)move] for m1 =0⇔ q1 = q.
2. Some move, some stay: E [U(0)wait]=E [U(0)move] for 0 ≤ m1 ≤
H − M ⇔ q ≤ q1 ≤ p.
3. Everyone moves: E [U(0)wait] <E[U(0)move] for m1 >H− M ⇔ q1 =
p.
These three alternatives characterize diﬀerent equilibrium patterns at
stage 0. Nothing happens in later periods as long as the L−state prevails:
The exact same inequalities will hold at stage 1 -o ra ta n yp e r i o dt>0 -a s
in period 0, as long as demand is in the L−state, so no one ﬁnds it in their
interest to move. For instance, if some, but not all of those who lost their
7j o bm o v ea ts t a g e0, those left will be indiﬀerent between moving or waiting
also at later stages, and none of them will leave. To explain and verify these
statements, and to characterize the equilibria in more detail, it is helpful to
take hold of the interior equilibrium (case 2):
3.2 The interior equilibrium
In an interior equilibrium only a fraction of the unemployed leave, the rest
decide to wait another period in sector A. For this to be an equilibrium,
t h o s ew a i t i n gm u s tg e te x a c t l yt h es a m ee x p e c t e dl i f e t i m ei n c o m ea st h o s e
moving (otherwise some of them would move, or some of the movers would
not). Formally, we have an interior equilibrium if and only if there exists
an m1, denoted e m, such that for 0 ≤ e m ≤ H − M we have E [U(0)wait]=
E [U(0)move].7 From equation 2 we see that E [U(0)wait] is a recursive value;
it depends on the maximal value in the next period. We know that the value




w−c, ∀t. Furthermore, we know that when e m individuals leave at stage
0, those left are indiﬀerent between moving and staying at stage 0. However,
since the transition probability is constant over time, those waiting in sector
A are indiﬀerent between moving and staying at stage 1 if and only if everyone
who is left decides to stay. In other words, we know that the equilibrium will
entail E [U(1)wait]=E[U(1)move]=E [U(0)wait]=E [U(0)move] for m2 = e m.
T h es a m ea r g u m e n th o l d sf o rany period where demand is still in the L-state..
We can use this information to ﬁnd e m :






























7Strictly speaking, for this arbitrage condition to hold with equality, m must be a
continues variable. Since m represents the number of individuals that move from sector A it
is not a continues variable. However, taking account of this whole number restriction does
not change anything of importance, but it would make the exposition more cumbersome.
Assume that e m is not a whole number and let e m− b et h ec l o s e s tw h o l en u m b e rl o w e rt h a n
e m,and e m+ the closest whole number higher than e m. In the case of an interior equilibrium,
instead of saying that we have an equilibrium e m that makes those waiting indiﬀerent
between waiting and moving, we would have to say that those waiting get a slightly lower
welfare than those moving if e m− workers move, but a slightly higher welfare than those
moving if e m+ workers move. Our Nash equilibrium concept then requires e m+ workers to
move.





w−c for max{E [U(1)]wait,E[U(1)]move}
in (2). If we solve (3) we ﬁnd
e m = H − L − p
cδ
(δc − c − b + w)
(M − L). (4)
We know that e m must satisfy 0 ≤ e m ≤ H−M, which imply that there exists
an interior solution if and only if
1 ≤ p
cδ





This gives us suﬃcient information to characterize the transition process
in this economy. Let m∗
1 be the equilibrium number of individuals that move
from sector A immediately after there has been slump in demand. Based on
the discussion above we can conclude
Proposition 1 For a constant transition probability we have three types of
equilibria:
1. m∗




1 = e m = H − L − p δc




1 = H − L, for p cδ
(cδ−c−b+w) < 1
This proposition characterizes the number of unemployed workers that
leave sector A immediately after the drop in demand.8 Given a constant
probability of a transition to state M, there will be no further action before
demand recovers. If that happens, those who still do not get a job in the
recovering sector, seek work elsewhere.
In the ﬁr s tc a s e ,t h ep r o b a b i l i t yo fm a r k e tr e t u r n ,t h eu n e m p l o y m e n tb e n -
eﬁts and the moving costs are all suﬃciently high as to make no unemployed
worker want to leave, even if this means that the recall probability q is at its
minimum, q ( a si ti sw h e nn oo n el e a v e s ) .
In the second case, the prospects of waiting are slightly less appealing;
if everyone else waits each person is better oﬀ moving. But if some workers
leave the recall probability of those left increases, and for the quoted range of
parameter values, it increases enough to compensate the remaining workers.
8We can think of this equilibrium as being produced by individuals leaving the sector
sequentially. If workers diﬀe rb y ,s a y ,h a v i n gd i ﬀerent moving costs, but the distribution
of these costs are common knowledge, sequential moving will produce the same kind of
equilibrium. However, with diﬀerent moving costs, the individuals that leave have lower
moving costs than the ones who stay.
9In the third case, the prospects in sector A are really gloomy: Even if
everyone else has left, and the recall probability is at its maximum, will an
individual, still deliberating his options, not ﬁnd it worthwhile to wait in
sector A.
Two observations should be emphasized. There is an interesting discon-
tinuity in the transition process described above. If the beneﬁts of waiting
are high, so high that we are in the interior of regime 1 where no one leaves,
a small reduction in the beneﬁts of waiting will not change the number of
people leaving sector A. I nr e g i m e2 ,w h e r es o m ec h o o s et ow a i t ,t h e r ei s
a smooth response in the number of individuals that leave; if it becomes a
little bit less attractive to wait in sector A, the response is a small increase
i nt h en u m b e ro fp e o p l et h a tl e a v e .A sw ea p p r o a c hr e g i m e3 ,h o w e v e r ,t h e r e
is a dramatic change: A small reduction in the payoﬀ of waiting, e.g. in
the unemployment beneﬁts, will now result in a surge of individuals leaving
sector A.9
The second observation worth mentioning is that if M approaches H the
set of parameter values that gives an interior equilibrium shrinks. In the limit
the interior equilibrium vanishes, in that case either none or all unemployed
workers leave sector A.
4 A decreasing transition probability
In this section we study a case where the probability of a transition from
state L to M decreases with time; pt+1 <p t for t ≥ 1.10 Our aim is to
characterize the ﬂow of workers leaving sector A as time passes after the
slump in demand. Again, we focus on a transition process that satisﬁes a
Nash equilibrium at each stage; candidate solutions must be such that the
move or stay decision made by those still waiting in sector A is optimal given
the decision made by others.
In the preceding section we characterized three types of equilibria; (i) no
unemployed workers move before the market returns (if it does), (ii) a fraction
of the unemployed workers move at their ﬁrst possible chance, the rest stays
in sector A until demand increases (if it does) and (iii) every unemployed
worker moves immediately. The same type of exit patterns, where none, some
9If workers were not identical, the transition might be smoother.
10It is, of course, the unemployed workers belief about how likely a transition is that
determines their decision to move or not. Our speciﬁcation, with a declining transition
probability, can be thought of as a reduced form modelling of a situation where Bayesian
updating of beliefs - given that the market has not yet returned - results in a lower estimate
of the return probability as time passes.
10or all of the unemployed workers move, are equilibrium outcomes also with
a decreasing transition probability. However, unless everyone moves from
sector A at once, there might be a steady ﬂow of unemployed workers leaving
the sector. Furthermore, the case where no one moves from sector A might
not be a stationary situation; eventually the probability of a transition to
state M could become suﬃciently low as to induce at least some unemployed
individuals to start leaving.
To characterize the transition patterns formally, let us again enter at
stage 0, immediately after there has been a decline in demand. If everyone
moves, there can be no action afterwards. In the interior equilibrium, a
fraction of the unemployed workers leave sector A immediately, the rest wait.
In the next period, if the market has not returned, the unemployed view
the market return probability as being reduced; that is p2 <p 1. Then, if
no more workers move, any single worker would beneﬁtf r o mm o v i n g( t h e y
were indiﬀerent before; now the probability of market return is reduced).
However, all workers might not exit sector A: As some workers move, the
recall probability is increased, compensating for the reduced market return
probability. Thus, even at this stage, there might be an interior equilibrium,
but it will entail a larger number of workers having left sector A.
Eventually, the probability of market return could become suﬃciently
low as to ensure that mt = H − M. Then, again, the positive externality
disappears, and a further decrease in the probability of market return induces
every unemployed worker to leave the sector.
We again take hold of the interior equilibrium. In this equilibrium - for
the workers that wait to be indiﬀerent between staying and moving - a de-
creased market return probability has to be compensated for by an increased
number of workers moving. In short, the recall probability has to be constant
over periods. If it is not, our Nash equilibrium concept is violated: With a
constant expected utility of moving, an increased recall probability invariably
increases the relative payoﬀ from staying. Then if workers were indiﬀerent at
a previous stage, they cannot be indiﬀerent now (and vice versa). The same
argument applies if the recall probability decreases over time.
Assume that the constant recall probability in the interior equilibrium is
given by a; that is:
pt+1
M − L
H − L − mt+1
= a. (6)
a will be depending on the parameters of the model, w, b, c and δ. We
determine the exact functional form of a later.
The following ﬁgure represents (6) for 0 ≤ mt+1 ≤ H − M. If the above
equation speciﬁes mt+1 >H− M, it is no longer valid, as discussed in the
11previous section. However, then the positive externality is no longer present,
and a further reduction in the probability of market return means that every
worker has an incentive to move. Thus for pt+1 <a ,m t+1 = H − L :11
Figure 1
If pt+1 lies between a and a H−L
M−L, a reduction in pt+1 will lead to more
workers moving. As we can see, this rate of increase in the number of movers
is constant for pt+1 ∈ (a,a H−L
M−L). However, there is a discontinuous increase
in the number of movers for pt+1 = a. This corresponds to the discussion in
the last section, noting that a will be dependent upon w,b and c.12
We will now ﬁnd the explicit form of a. This is quite easy, since letting
pt+1 = p (a constant), we should be able to get exactly t h es a m er e s u l t sa si n
the previous section. From the last section we had that every worker moved
if and only if p cδ
(cδ−c−b+w) < 1 ⇔ p<
w−b−c(1−δ)
cδ . From ﬁgure 1, it is readily
seen that the same will be true if and only if p<a .This is suﬃcient to
determine a, which is then given by:
a =
w − b − c(1 − δ)
cδ
(7)
11The equilibria presented here can be obtained using a standard backward induction
argument: With falling probability of market return, this probability will eventually reach
zero or some non-zero constant value. Either way, the process eﬀectively reaches a station-
ary state at some point in time. We are then in the exact same situation as in section 3,
with a constant probability of market return. Using backward induction from this point
in time, the payoﬀ from staying is determined at each stage as a function of the outside
option only (at each stage, the inside option has to be equal to the outside option). This
uniquely determines the equilibrium presented here.
12Again, allowing for non-identical workers may smoothen the transition.
12Proposition 2 As long as the probability of market return is above some
value p, no workers move. For p within a given interval (p,p), some - but
not all - workers move, and a decrease in the probability of market return
results in a steady increase in the number of workers that move. However,
for p = p, there is a surge in the number of movers, and for p<p , every
unemployed worker has left sector 1.
Proof. The results are evident from the above discussion provided p =
a H−L
M−L and p = a.
One peculiarity of our model can be noted: In the general case, a reduc-
tion in the probability of market revival will (eventually) lead to more workers
moving. As some workers move, the probability that the remaining workers
get a job, provided the market revives, increases. However, when this prob-
ability reaches unity, and every remaining worker is assured a job provided
market revival, then a further ε-reduction in the market revival probability
induces every remaining worker to leave. Thus when recall (given market
revival) ﬁnally is assured, all remaining workers move.
5P o l i c y
In regime 1 - where no one leaves sector A -a n di nr e g i m e2-w h e r es o m e
leave, but not all - there is unemployment in the economy. All, or some, of
those who have lost their job in sector A, prefer to stay unemployed, even
though there are available jobs elsewhere. The level of unemployment in
period t is simply given as





H − Li fp t > p
(M − L)
pt
a if p ≤ pt ≤ p
0 if pt <p .
We may distinguish between unemployment and excessive unemployment
in this set up. It is perhaps beneﬁcial, evaluated from society’s point of
view, to let some workers stay unemployed in A and wait for better times, it
depends on the shadow price of public funds (associated with unemployment
transfers) and the magnitude of the moving costs. It is however never optimal
- again evaluated from society’s point of view - to let more workers wait than
the maximum number of workers that can get rehired if market conditions
improve. But in regime 1 and 2 this is exactly what happens, and hence,
13under the conditions speciﬁed in the propositions above, we get excessive
unemployment.
Furthermore, if we consider the unemployed workers in sector A as a
group, they are obviously better oﬀ - again referring to regime 1 and 2 - if
more workers leave sector A. The reason is of course the externality associated
with moving from sector A;a sl o n ga sf e w e rt h a nH − M workers have left,
each person that decides to leave increases the recall probability of those
waiting in sector A. Thus, our analysis provides an argument - augmenting
the results of standard search theory - for using policy measures to reduce
unemployment.
The level of unemployment in our model depends on various policy vari-
ables. By taking partial derivatives of the unemployment level ut in regime
1 and 2, with respect to the relevant policy variables, we ﬁnd the following
eﬀects: In regime 1 no one leaves sector A because they strictly prefer staying
unemployed in A over seeking employment elsewhere. A small change in any
policy instruments have no eﬀect on unemployment in this case. But, mov-
i n gi n t or e g i m e2 ,w eﬁnd that a small reduction in unemployment beneﬁts,
or a small increase in a moving cost subsidy, means that more unemployed
workers choose to leave sector A. Note that as we approach the boundary
between regime 2 and 3, a further reduction in unemployment beneﬁts (or
increase in the moving cost subsidy) generate a large response in the number
of individuals that leave sector A: If a policy change implies a shift from
regime 2 to 3, M − L workers will leave sector A.
I nt h eU . S . ,e x p e r i m e n t sh a v eb e e nc o n d u c t e da i m e da te v a l u a t i n gt h e
eﬀects of cash reemployment bonuses (see for instance Meyer (1995)). Such
experiments seem to conﬁrm that direct incentives do aﬀect behavior of the
unemployed. A reemployment bonus would in our simple model take the
form of a moving cost subsidy. As we have discussed, such a subsidy will
never increase unemployment, but wether it has a small or a large unemploy-
ment reducing eﬀect depends on the recall expectations of the unemployed.
However, as noted by Meyer (1995), permanent reemployment bonuses may
prove to increase the number of unemployed, as the cost of leaving work is
reduced with the introduction of such a bonus. This exact consideration can-
not be captured in our simple set-up. However, in the following we discuss a
related situation, where the initiation of government job creation programs
may induce more workers to wait for a recall:
145.1 What if the government can aﬀect the recall prob-
ability?
The government might want to initiate some sort of job creation program
if unemployment is high. Modelling such a situation involves endogenizing
the recall probability, which we have so far treated in a rather mechanical
fashion. Expanding the set-up to include this kind of situation, however, only
comes at a considerable expositional cost. For the purposes of this paper,
we do not embark on such calculations as the most important insights can
easily be grasped without explicitly modelling government behavior:
Say for instance that there is no chance that demand will recover if mar-
k e t sa r el e f ta l o n e .I nt h i sc a s eap o s i t i v er e c a l lp r o b a b i l i t ys t e m sf r o mt h e
fact that the government might initiate measures to reduce unemployment.
As we have seen in the previous sections, such a recall probability will gener-
ally lead to fewer workers leaving (if the recall probability is not very small)
than if the workers did not perceive recall to be a possibility. Thus the mere
possibility of a policy intervention might in fact induce unemployment. We
would expect these job creation programs to be costly to the government,
and consequently, the authorities face a type Samaritan’s Dilemma: If it was
possible for the government to commit not to intervene, every worker would
leave and there would be no unemployment. Without this commitment,
however, more workers wait and structural adjustment slows down. The ar-
gument does not depend upon our extreme assumption that the market may
not recover by itself. What is needed, is the possibility that the government -
albeit possibly involuntarily - contribute to the perceived revival probability.
If the government can aﬀect the recall probability we might also get a
situation with multiple equilibria. Assume for example that the government
would not do anything to increase demand in sector A if unemployment
is relatively low. On the other hand, for high rates of unemployment, the
government might feel forced to initiate job creation programs, and thus the
Samaritan’s Dilemma applies if only a limited number of workers move. It is
not diﬃcult to see that this kind of situation could lead to two equilibria: one
w h e r eal o to fw o r k e r sl e a v ea n dt h eg o v e r n m e n td o e sn o ti n t e r v e n e ,a n do n e
where few workers leave and the government initiates job creation programs.
Thus multiple equilibria might arise because the government cannot commit
not to battle high levels of unemployment.
156T h e w a r o f a t t r i t i o n
We have analyzed a ”game” where many individuals contest over multiple
‘prizes’ (H − L laid oﬀ workers wait for M − L possible recalls). As noted
in the introduction, Clark and Riis (1996) and Bulow and Klemperer (1999)
have discussed similar problems. In Bulow and Klemperer (1999) there is a
war of attrition where N + K ﬁrms compete for N prizes. At each moment
a ﬁrm, still hanging in there, can exit or continue the costly competition.
Suppose the game ends when K ﬁrms has left, and the payoﬀ of a ﬁrm that
opts out is independent of how long the game between those who remain lasts.
In this case Bulow and Klemperer show that there exists only one symmetric
equilibrium in which K − 1 ﬁrms drop out immediately (or arbitrarily fast)
and only N +1ﬁrms remain: ”If N ﬁrms can be proﬁtable in the market
and dropouts pay no costs after exiting then competition in the symmetric
equilibrium will immediately shake out to just one too many ﬁrms to be
proﬁtable.”13 As the preceding analysis show, this result does not extend to
our model. It is not, in general, the case that H−M−1 workers immediately
move from sector A,l e a v i n gM −L+1(one too many) workers waiting for a
r e c a l l .Aq u i c kl o o ka tﬁgure 1 tells us that this might happen in our model,
but only as a special case.
The reason why the ”one too many”-result does not apply in our setting
is that ”our” game ends with an exogenous probability: There is a positive
probability that the market revives in each period, in that case the game
is over and those waiting are randomly recalled to the new job openings.
The game does, in other words, not come to an end when the number of
individuals match the number of prizes, as in Bulow and Klemperer (1999).
This is precisely why it might be the best response for a worker to stay
unemployed in sector A for one more period even though more than M−L+1
follow the same strategy. We can conclude that in a multiple prize war of
attrition with uncertain termination, the shake-out might not be so extensive
that only one too many participate in the game. In our model, less than
H − M − 1 workers leave if the exogenous probability that the game ‘ends’
soon is relatively high. However, if this probability is low, shake-out might
be more extensive than in Bulow and Klemperer (1999).
13”No costs after exiting” refers to costs that are incurred by an exiting ﬁrm after the
ﬁrm has exited and before the game ends. A similar result is reported in Clark and Riis
(1996); in a multi prize contest they ﬁnd an equilibirum in which ”one too many” actively
participate in the contest (and they play a randomized strategy).
167 Conclusions
In this paper we have studied worker reallocation when the unemployed face
endogenous recall possibilities. We showed that structural adjustment might
be slow - too slow even when taking the point of view of the workers them-
selves. Changing policy variables by a small amount can have no eﬀect on
unemployment if recall probabilities are high, but may have a huge impact
if recall probabilities are suﬃciently low. If the authorities can directly af-
fect the recall probability, a problem resembling a Samaritan’s Dilemma may
arise: If the government cannot credibly commit to refrain from initiating
job creation programs, more workers could choose to stay unemployed in
anticipation of the program. Furthermore, this ‘game’ between the workers
and the government may exhibit multiple equilibria.
The novel feature of our set-up is the modelling of recall probabilities as
endogenous: When a worker chooses to leave the sector that has experienced
a slump in demand, the remaining unemployed workers are all better oﬀ
because the probability of being rehired, given market revival, increases. This
positive externality leads there to be too few workers moving. Furthermore, it
also creates the possibility that workers might not move all at once, instead
dropping out of the sector in a continuous pace. Thus, in conclusion, too
few workers leave, and the adjustment process drags out over time. On the
surface, our analysis then augments the literature on search in suggesting the
need for programs speciﬁcally targeted at inducing the unemployed to seek
new employment. However, we show that such programs may - if not carefully
designed - contribute to, rather than prevent, slow structural adjustment.
Finally, our model suggests an avenue for further research into the litera-
ture on contests. We argue that the set-up utilized in this paper is primarily
a war of attrition with uncertainty concerning when the game ends. Com-
paring our results to those of Bulow and Klemperer (1999), we demonstrate
how adding uncertainty in this way may have a non-triﬂing impact on the
outcomes of such games.
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